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The Obligation to Undertake an Environmental Assessment in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ: A 
Principle in Search for Autonomy 
 
The practice of carrying out an environmental impact assessment (EIA) has gained strength in 
international law and jurisprudence, finding application in the case law of the ICJ. If, on one side, 
the ICJ has recognized the customary nature of this principle, on the other its application poses a set 
of challenges, mainly linked to the autonomy of this obligation from other international 
environmental law norms. More precisely, the obligation at issue has been applied in connection 
with the due diligence and notification principles, creating uncertainty about its scope, as well as 
about its substantive or procedural nature. Likewise, the autonomy of the obligation to perform an 
EIA has been challenged in relation to the definition of the content and scope of the obligation 
itself, which in turn is linked to the existence of applicable treaty provisions or of soft law. This 
article discusses the impact of these elements on the reasoning of the Court in the cases at issue, in 
order to demonstrate how such lack of autonomy can undermine the coherence of the reasoning 
itself and, therefore, an effective application of the principle.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
Nowadays, the obligation to conduct an EIA in relation to any project capable of having a 
significant impact on the environment has been introduced in most national systems, as well as at 
the international level. Such a normative aspect is rooted in the effectiveness which is almost 
unanimously associated to EIA : even if it is extremely difficult to quantify the benefits determined 
by the performance of an EIA in relation to a given project, the doctrine generally recognizes that 
such a practice tends to improve the quality of decision making and of the design of the plan, 
mainly in terms of mitigation of negative environmental impacts and of choice of “greener” 
options.
1
 Further benefits have been identified in enhanced transparency towards civil society and 
better cooperation between the proponent and public authorities which, in turn, can contribute to a 
higher acceptance of the project and to reduced litigation costs.
2
 On the other side, the costs for the 
proponent appear to be reasonable if not limited : the performance of an EIA has been broadly 
                                                          
1
 Institute for environmental studies, Cost and benefits of the EIA directive (2007), at p.12. 
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 Ibid., at p. 13-14. 
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estimated to be below 1% of the total investment cost;
3
 costs for public administration are more 
difficult to determine, as EIA often takes place in parallel with other procedures for the same 
project.
4
 In a similar way, estimates regarding time costs caused by the performance of an EIA 
differ widely, even though there is no widespread evidence that such a procedure regularly 
determines significant delays in the completion of the project.
5
   
The role played by EIA in the protection of the environment has been recognized at the 
international level as early as 1992, when the Rio Declaration
6
 established the obligation of States 
to undertake an EIA when proposing activities that could have an impact on the environment. 
Article 17 of the Declaration states that: “Environmental impact assessment, as a national 
instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse 
impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.” 
Notwithstanding the non-binding force of the Declaration, with the insertion of Article 17 its 
drafters gave a strong signal as to the relevance the principle
7
 was acquiring in international 
environmental law. Such relevance had already been underlined, though a soft law instrument, by 
the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), which, in 1987, published the Goals and 
Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment,
8
 a set of guidelines aiming to set out in detail the 
modalities through which EIA had to be conducted by States. An even stronger endorsement of the 
principle came with the adoption, in 1991, of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment 
in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention);
9
 the Convention, drafted in the framework of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, entered into force in 1997 and was completed in 
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2003 by a Protocol concerning strategic environmental assessment.
10
 Leaving aside specific 
instruments dealing exclusively with this procedure, the obligation to undertake an EIA is contained 
in several international conventions – among which the Convention on Biological Diversity11 and 
the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
12
 – as well as in the International 
Law Commission Draft Articles concerning Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities.
13
 
In the light of these elements, the obligation to perform an EIA is deemed to have acquired 
customary nature; however, strong uncertainties persist with regard to its scope and content, as 
clearly emerges from the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Increasingly 
faced with cases concerning the protection of the environment and involving the obligation for 
States to undertake an EIA, the Court has recognized its customary nature, though appearing 
uncomfortable with some aspects of its application. On the basis of the analysis of the relevant 
jurisprudence, it is submitted, in particular, that the principle obliging States to undertake an EIA 
suffers from a lack of autonomy from other international environmental law principles. This, in 
turn, implies a set of consequences on its application, among which a problematic cross-
contamination between procedural and substantial aspects, which are capable of undermining the 
effectiveness of EIA itself. 
These aspects have not yet been specifically addressed by existing literature which focussed, on one 
side, on the definition and application of the principle in the context of specific geographical 
areas,
14
 national systems,
15
 actors
16
, international organizations
17
 or treaties
18
 and, on the other, on 
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the recognition of its customary nature.
19
 This article therefore aims to fill this lacuna through the 
analysis of the jurisprudence of the ICJ, whose case-law is of crucial relevance for the assessment 
of customary international law. A proper understanding of the content of the obligation to carry out 
an EIA can be of interest for academics as well as for practitioners, in the first place those involved 
in the drafting of national legislation, given that, as will be seen, the content of an EIA is still 
mainly based on national law. In addition to this, the topic can be of direct relevance for those who, 
at the national and international level, are responsible for the authorisation or funding of projects 
capable of having a transboundary impact on the environment, as failure to carry out an adequate 
EIA could be invoked in front of a tribunal as a ground preventing the completion of the project. 
The Article is structured as follows: after a short overview of the emergence and consolidation, in 
the jurisprudence of the Court, of the principle imposing an EIA (section II), the issue of the lack of 
autonomy will be addressed (section III), and its consequences on the jurisprudence of the Court 
assessed (section IV). Finally, some suggestions and final remarks will follow (section V). 
 
 
II. The Recognition of the Principle by the ICJ: From Nuclear Test II to Certain activities in the 
border area. 
 
It was not before 2010 – in the Pulp Mills case – that the principle imposed on States to carry out an 
EIA found explicit application by the Court. However, its relevance came into play far earlier, 
starting from the Nuclear Test II case, introduced by New Zealand in 1995 and concerning nuclear 
experiments carried out by France in the Pacific Ocean.
20
 In its oral statements, New Zealand 
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affirmed the obligation for France to carry out an EIA before any major project that might affect the 
marine environment, based not only on the Noumea Convention binding the two States,
21
 but also 
on customary law.
22
 
As is known, the Court did not enter into the merits of the subject matter, arguing that the 
possibility of revising the first judgment issued in 1974 was restricted to tests carried out in the 
atmosphere, whereas the tests that formed the object of the new claim would take place 
underground.
23
 Notwithstanding this, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Weeramantry took into 
account the principle imposing an EIA, which, in his view, was gathering strength and international 
acceptance, and had reached the level of “general recognition” of which the Court should take 
notice.
24
 After having recalled the UNEP Principles mentioned above, the Judge affirmed that the 
magnitude of the problems alleged by New Zealand made the principle applicable in the case at 
stake.
25
 Moreover, he argued that, based on the “position of special trust and responsibility in 
relation to the principles of environmental law” occupied by the Court, the Court was entitled to 
take into account the EIA principle when a prima facie case was made of the possibility of 
environmental damage.
26
 Finally, the Judge pointed out that a potential finding of the absence of 
any risk, though plausible, would be reached after the EIA, and not before.
27
 
A few years later, the same judge devoted a part of his separate opinion in the case of Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros
28
 to the principle of “continuing environmental impact assessment”. In particular – and 
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despite the fact that the principle imposing an EIA was not invoked by the parties to the dispute or 
applied by the Court – the Judge stated that the principle played an important role in the case at 
issue, and underscored its nature as a continuing process that should take place as long as the 
project is in operation. Such a statement was justified not only on EIA being a “dynamic principle”, 
but also on considerations of prudence, as any project can have unexpected consequences, 
especially if great in size and scope.
29
 According to the Judge, the customary nature of continuous 
monitoring as part of the obligation to carry out an EIA found support in international and domestic 
practice and, from a theoretical point of view, on an EIA being a specific application of the larger 
general principle of caution.
30
 
In the case at stake, the applicability of the principle was not raised as an issue, as monitoring 
obligations were contained in the treaty that formed the basis of the jurisdiction of the Court; 
however, the Judge submitted that the obligation to carry out an EIA should be considered as “in-
built” in any treaty that may reasonably be considered to have a significant impact upon the 
environment, on the basis of environmental law in its current state of development.
31
 
As mentioned above, the Pulp Mills case
32
 was the first time that the principle was explicitly dealt 
with by the Court. In this case, concerning the construction of two pulp mills on the banks of the 
Uruguay River, the obligation to perform an EIA was invoked by Argentina, according to which 
Uruguayan authorities released the authorization to construct the plants without transmitting an 
adequate EIA.
33
 
In its judgment, the Court fully recognized the customary nature of the obligation to perform an 
EIA by describing it as “a practice, which in recent years has gained so much acceptance among 
States that it may now be considered a requirement under general international law”.34 In the words 
of the Court, “where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant 
adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource”, an EIA has to be 
performed.
35
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The position is confirmed in recent cases
36
 concerning the occupation of Costa Rican territory by 
Uruguay, including dredging and canalization activities on the San Juan River
37
 and the violation of 
Nicaragua’s territorial integrity by the construction of a road in the border area.38 The obligation to 
perform an EIA was invoked by both parties: according to Costa Rica, Nicaragua should have 
conducted such an assessment before carrying out dredging works,
39
 but according to the 
counterparty, Costa Rica breached the same obligation in relation to the construction of the road.
40
 
Recalling its statements in the Pulp Mills case, the Court confirmed the customary nature of the 
principle obliging States to undertake an EIA, pointing out that, even if the Pulp Mills ruling 
referred to industrial activities, the principle applies generally to proposed activities that may have a 
significant adverse impact in a transboundary context.
41
 
On the basis of this jurisprudence, it can, therefore, be concluded that the principle imposed on 
States to perform an EIA before commencing activities that may cause damage to the environment 
has been definitely recognized by the Court as part of customary international law.
42
 
This said, the recognition of this obligation as a customary one merely forms the premise of the real 
object of this analysis, i.e. the scope of the obligation itself and its status as an autonomous legal 
principle of international environmental law. 
 
III. The Duty to Undertake an EIA: An Autonomous Principle or an Ancillary obligation? 
 
The autonomous or ancillary nature of the principle obliging States to perform an EIA can be 
analysed, first of all, in its relation to other procedural and substantive environmental obligations.
43
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This issue is clearly exemplified by the Pulp Mills case, where the principle is taken into account in 
the paragraph concerning the breach of procedural obligations and, more precisely, in the 
subparagraph relating to the duty to notify the plans concerning a new activity to the other party. 
Such a duty is established by Article 7 of the 1975 Statute linking the two parties: according to this 
provision the notification shall describe the main aspects of the work and any other technical data 
that will enable to assess the impact of the activity on the régime of the river.
44
 In this context, the 
EIA is, therefore, seen not as an autonomous obligation, but as part and parcel of the obligation to 
notify, as confirmed by the statement of the Court according to which the EIA mandated by Article 
7 is intended to enable the notified party to participate in the process of ensuring that the assessment 
is complete.
45
 Argentina was found to be in breach of the duty to notify not by reason of the content 
of the EIA, but because the EIA was notified to Argentina after (and not before) the activity was 
undertaken.
46
 
Similarly, in the same case, the duty to perform an EIA is linked to substantive environmental 
obligations: in the words of the Court, the subparagraph specifically devoted to EIA deals with “the 
relationship
47
 between the need for an environmental impact assessment … and the obligations of 
the Parties under Article 41”, i.e. the obligation to adopt adequate domestic measures that aim to 
protect the aquatic environment.
48
 Such a relationship is described in two ways: on one side, the 
obligation to protect and preserve the environment established by Article 41 of the 1975 Statute has 
to be interpreted in accordance with the obligation to undertake an EIA.
49
 On the other, “due 
diligence, and the duty of vigilance and prevention which it implies, would not be considered to 
have been exercised” if an EIA is not duly performed.50 
Once again, therefore, the obligation to conduct an EIA is not recognized as having full autonomy, 
but is analysed in relation to another obligation – in this case, the duty to prevent environmental 
harm, which, in turn, is contained in both treaty (the 1975 Statute) and customary obligations. In 
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this context, the principle works both as an interpretative tool with respect to the duties established 
by Article 41 and as a conditio sine qua non with respect to the principles of due diligence, 
vigilance and prevention. It is, therefore, plausible to conclude, using the words of the Court, that 
the analysis is focused not on the principle in itself, but on the “role of the environmental impact 
assessment in the context of procedural obligations” and “in the fulfilment of the substantive 
obligations” of the parties.51 
It is true that the obligation to perform an EIA was not, as such, contained in the 1975 Statute, 
which could explain the choice to deal with it in relation to other obligations more as a necessity 
linked to the applicable law than as a deliberate approach. However, at least two elements suggest 
this second hypothesis. First of all, the relationship, established by the Court, between an EIA and 
customary international norms such as due diligence, vigilance and prevention expands its analysis 
beyond treaty law. Second, the fact that the recognition by the Court of the obligation to perform an 
EIA as a customary norm would have enabled it, regardless of the treaty provisions, to consider it 
independently from other obligations. 
The issue of the autonomous or ancillary nature of the principle arises for a second time in the joint 
cases involving Costa Rica and Uruguay where, as mentioned above, the customary nature of the 
principle is recognized and where the ICJ states that: “to fulfill its obligation to exercise due 
diligence in preventing significant transboundary environmental harm, a State must, before 
embarking on an activity having the potential adversely to affect the environment of another State, 
ascertain if there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, which would trigger the requirement to 
carry out an environmental impact assessment.”52 
That statement implies that the obligation to perform an EIA, far from being considered as an 
autonomous one, is dependent upon two different factors: due diligence and prevention obligations 
and the ascertainment of a risk of significant harm to the environment. In relation to the first factor, 
similarly to what observed in the Pulp Mills case, the obligation to undertake an EIA is framed in 
terms of a means-end relationship with respect to due diligence and prevention obligations. Even if 
it is not possible, in this context, to enter into details of the complex issue of the definition of due 
diligence,
53
 suffice it to say that such a definition in turn affects the relationship between due 
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diligence and the duty to perform an EIA, especially in relation to the qualification of due diligence 
as an obligation of conduct or as an obligation of result.
54
  
Finally, a further aspect of the autonomy of the obligation to conduct an EIA concerns the definition 
of its content, which in turn is linked to the existence of an international law source that can work as 
applicable law in the assessment of parties’ conduct. In the Pulp Mills case, the Court ruled out the 
application of the Espoo Convention on the basis of the fact that neither State was party to it, but 
observed that the UNEP Guidelines, though not binding, had to be taken into account “as guidelines 
issued by an international technical body”.55 Based on that, the Court established that: “it is for each 
State to determine in its domestic legislation or in the authorization process for the project, the 
specific content of the environmental impact assessment required in each case, having regard to the 
nature and magnitude of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the 
environment as well as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment.”56 
Such an approach is confirmed in the Certain activities and Construction of a Road cases, whereas 
no mention is made of international instruments.
57
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55
 Pulp Mills, supra note 32, at para. 205. 
56
 Ibid., para. 205. 
57
 Certain activities, supra note 36, at para. 104. 
11 
 
If, therefore, this jurisprudence seems to confirm the non-autonomous character of the principle, the 
analysis of the impact of such an approach on the reasoning of the Court constitutes a further, 
interesting step. 
 
IV. The Lack of Autonomy of the Principle and its Impact on the Reasoning of the Court 
 
If, as illustrated above, the performance of an EIA is generally deemed to bring about 
environmental benefits, an autonomous application of the corresponding normative principle – the 
obligation to perform an EIA – is of the essence. What it is argued, therefore, is that the lack of 
autonomy, far from being a mere formal aspect of the legal reasoning, can impact on the 
effectiveness of the principle and jeopardise its benefits. 
A first, relevant consequence of the lack of autonomy of the obligation to undertake an EIA is 
related to the distinction between procedural and substantive obligations. As has been shown, the 
obligation to perform an EIA, being an instrumental one, does not qualify as procedural or 
substantive per se. This determines a certain contamination, in the reasoning of the Court, between 
these two dimensions and, more precisely, the fact that compliance with what is ultimately a 
procedure might become dependent on factual aspects. It is submitted that this could undermine the 
very rationale of EIA, i.e. the identification of future environmental harm, to the extent that the 
presence of harm, instead of being the outcome of the process, becomes one of its constitutive 
elements. This, in turn, could undermine some of the main advantages associated to EIA, such as 
the improvement of the design of the project and the choice of more environmentally sound options.  
The problems stemming from establishing a link between the performance of an EIA and 
substantial aspects have been underlined by Judge Dugard, who argued that the “danger” of viewing 
the due diligence obligation as the source of the obligation to perform an EIA is that it allows a 
State to argue, retrospectively, that because no harm has been proved at the time of the legal 
proceedings, no duty of due diligence arose.
58
 According to the Judge, such a “backward looking 
approach” was applied in the Certain activities case, where the Court confirmed the finding – 
already contained in the study carried out by Nicaragua in 2006 – that the dredging programme 
would have no impact on the river environment, which, in turn, allowed it to state that Nicaragua 
was not required to carry out an EIA.
59
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The mixing of procedural and substantive issues can be seen, first of all, in the Pulp Mills case. 
Here the analysis of the compliance – in the broader framework of the violation of substantive 
obligations – with the duty to carry out an EIA in relation to the choice of the site of the mill is split 
in two further questions: whether Uruguay failed to act with due diligence in conducting the EIA – 
particularly with respect to the choice of the location –  and whether the location chosen was 
actually unsuitable or could damage the environment of the river.
60
 Whereas the first point is 
assessed by taking into account the methodology followed (in particular, the consideration of 
alternative sites),
61
 as regards the second issue the Court focuses its analysis on substantial aspects, 
i.e. the capacity of the waters of the river to receive, dilute and disperse discharges of effluent from 
the plant.
62
 The reasoning of the Court is therefore logically flawed to the extent that it is based on 
the correct performance of the procedure and, at the same time, on the outcome that such a 
procedure should have brought about. 
The same applies to the Road in Costa Rica and Certain activities cases because of the fact that, as 
established by the Court, the obligation to undertake an EIA only arises once a preliminary 
assessment
63
 of the existence of a risk has been carried out. Once again, the performance of an EIA 
is made contingent upon an element – the existence of risk – which should be the result of EIA 
itself. In addition to this, the application of a probabilistic logic inherent in any risk assessment 
clashes with the very nature of EIA, which tends to be conceived as a quasi-automatic procedure. In 
any case, it would be hard to establish which threshold of risk is the one applied in the context of 
the preliminary assessment and which one in the context of the EIA.
64
 These thresholds, in turn, do 
not correspond to the one applied to ascertain risk after the activity has taken place.
65
  
                                                          
60
 Pulp Mills, supra note 32, at para. 209. 
61
 Ibid., at para. 210. 
62
 Ibid., at para. 211. 
63
 Certain activities, supra note 36, at para. 154. 
64
 It is interesting to note how a similar problem arose in relation to the application of Art. 5.7 of the Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS measures) (allowing Members to adopt a precautionary approach, and 
therefore to adopt trade-restrictive measures in the absence of scientific certainty) and the general obligation to ensure 
that SPS measures are based on a risk assessment contained in Art. 5.1 of the Agreement. In an attempt to clarify the 
relationship between the two provisions, the Appellate Body has affirmed that “Article 5.7 is concerned with situations 
where deficiencies in the body of scientific evidence do not allow a WTO Member to arrive at a sufficiently objective 
conclusion in relation to risk” and that the same provision, Art. 5.7, “contemplates situations where there is some 
evidentiary basis indicating the possible existence of a risk, but not enough to permit the performance of a risk 
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A further element that can undermine the effectiveness of the obligation to carry out an EIA lies in 
its relationship with the obligation to notify and to consult the other party. Whereas in the Pulp 
Mills case the EIA is ancillary to the obligation to notify, in the other cases the relationship is 
inverted as, according to the Court, such an obligation arises once the EIA has been carried out.
66
 
Such an approach raises some perplexities; first of all because it is not consistent with the most 
frequent formulations of the principle of consultation and notification, which consider it as a self-
standing obligation.
67
 As observed by Judge Donoghue, States’ practice does not justify such a 
formulation, as due diligence may call for notification at a different stage in the process, e.g. before 
the EIA has taken place.
68
 Moreover, from a practical point of view, the benefits in terms of  
transparency and public participation that generally stem from EIA would be reduced if the 
obligation to perform the EIA was only triggered when an obligation to notify exists, as this 
obligation does not always apply. On the other side, the opposite relationship would give rise to a 
paradoxical effect to the extent that failure to comply with the obligation to perform an EIA would 
exempt the defendant from the obligation to notify.
69
  
Finally, the statements by the Court with respect to the scope and content of the obligation to carry 
out an EIA raise a set of uncertainties. First of all, it is not clear whether with its pronouncement the 
Court meant to make a full-fledged renvoi to national legislation.
70
 Even if this was the case, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
assessment” (United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute, Report of the 
Appellate Body, WT/DS320/AB/R, 16 October 2008, at paras. 677–678). 
65
 Certain activities, supra note 36, Separate opinion of Judge Dugard, at para. 19. 
66
 Ibid., at para. 104. 
67
 See, for example, Art. 19 of the Rio Declaration (supra note 6), according to which “States shall provide prior and 
timely notification and relevant information to potentially affected States on activities that may have a significant 
adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall consult with those States at an early stage and in good faith”. See 
also Art. 15.2(b) of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (supra note 12) and Article 14.1(c) 
and (d) of the Convention on Biological Diversity (supra note 11). 
68
 Certain activities, supra note 36, Separate opinion of Judge Donoghue, at para. 21. 
69
 Certain activities, supra note 36, at para. 168 where the Court established that: “the duty to notify and consult does 
not call for examination by the Court in the present case, since the Court has established that Costa Rica has not 
complied with its obligation under general international law to perform an environmental impact assessment prior to the 
construction of the road.” 
70
 In this regard, see the separate opinion of Judge Donoghue, who excludes that the words of the Court can be read in 
terms of incorporating national legislation (Ibid., Separate opinion of Judge Donoghue, at para. 15). Contra see the 
opinion of Judge Bhandari, according to whom this possibility is actually allowed, even if the scarcity of guidance from 
the Court and other sources of international law lead one to think that there are presently no minimum binding standards 
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remains to be seen how national provisions (of which of the party in dispute?) could be reconciled 
with international instruments that, as in the case of UNEP Guidelines, just have to be “taken into 
account”. At the same time, the Court did set some criteria that could be interpreted as a sort of 
benchmark in case of judicial review and, therefore, point to the formation of a customary norm. 
The lack of a clear position in relation to this issue not only prevents a definition of the content of 
the principle, but also blurs the assessment of States’ conduct to the extent that the question as to 
what an EIA should in theory include merges with that as to what the EIA actually included. Such a 
problem is exemplified in the Pulp Mills ruling, where the Court first has to deal with the question 
as to whether the assessment should have, “as a matter of method”,71 necessarily considered 
alternative sites. However, its reasoning takes into account both whether the examination of 
alternative sites was mandated by UNEP Principles and whether Uruguay actually included this 
kind of information in its analysis.
72
 This démarche is even the more evident in relation to the point 
concerning the consultation with affected populations, with respect to which the Court affirms to 
deal (and actually deals) with the point whether these populations should have, “or73 have in fact, 
been consulted”.74 The uncertainty in the identification of the precise content of the obligation to 
carry out an EIA is likely to give birth to a vicious circle, to the extent that the lack of legal 
certainty might prompt judicial organs to rely, in the last resort, on national law and that no 
incentive will arise for States where legislation regarding EIA is still weak to adapt it to an 
international standard. 
 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
in this regard (Ibid., Separate opinion of Judge Bhandari, at para. 29). An intermediate position is the one held by Judge 
Dugard, who, on the basis of the works carried out by the ILC, affirms that that same matters are inherent in the nature 
of an EIA and cannot, therefore, be left to national legislation (Ibid., Separate opinion of Judge Dugard, at para. 18). In 
the sense that the content of the rule must be set by domestic law, see Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Jorge E. Viñuales, 
International Environmental Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), at p. 70. 
71
Pulp Mills, supra note 32, at para. 206. 
72
 Ibid., at para. 210. 
73
 Emphasis added. 
74
 Certain activities, supra note 36, at para. 206. In this regard, the decision of the Court not to find a legal obligation to 
consult with the public has been defined as “surprising” in the light of the emphasis put by several modern treaties on 
this point (Cymie R. Payne, ‘Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay’ 105 AJIL (2011), pp. 94 et sqq., at p. 100). 
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The jurisprudence analysed above enables us to make some remarks about the way the obligation to 
perform an EIA has been applied so far by the ICJ and, more precisely, about its independent status 
as a principle of international environmental law. 
As was underlined at the outset, the jurisprudence of the Court leaves no doubt as to the customary 
status of the principle. On the other hand, the obligation to perform an EIA struggles to find a 
definite shape, both in relation to other customary principles of public international law and in 
relation to existing treaty law.  
With respect to the first aspect, it has been remarked how the Court tends to consider the obligation 
to perform an EIA in conjunction with other environmental obligations. It is here submitted that, to 
achieve greater effectiveness in the ultimate aim of these principles (the protection of the 
environment), a decoupling would be recommendable. In the first place, the obligation to perform 
an EIA should be applied independently from due diligence and prevention obligations, not only as 
the definitions of these obligations are (especially the first one) not completely clear, but also to 
avoid a “backward looking approach”. As illustrated above, such an approach allows a 
determination that, where it is demonstrated that the activity does not pose any risk, the EIA is 
deemed to be not necessary. Likewise, the obligation to perform an EIA should also be assessed 
independently from the notification obligation; even if, in practical terms, the EIA often forms part 
of the documents that have to be notified to the other party, a separate application would allow the 
judge to hold the State responsible for two distinct breaches. This could be particularly useful in 
those circumstances (as the Pulp Mills case) where applicable treaty provisions are specific on 
notification obligations but more vague in relation to the performance of an EIA. 
This leads us to the last point, i.e. the content of the EIA and the existence of a customary norm 
that, regardless of applicable treaty provisions (e.g. the Espoo Convention), can identify a noyeau 
dur of information the EIA has to contain. In relation to this point, in his separate opinion, Judge 
Bhandari posited that, despite its regional nature, the Espoo Convention could be used as a 
“standard that nation States should strive towards”.75 Based on this idea, he suggested what he 
deemed could constitute a “lowest common denominator”76 while conducting an EIA, including e.g. 
a description of the activity and of potential alternatives.
77
 
                                                          
75
 Certain activities, supra note 36,  Separate opinion of Judge Bhandari, at para. 33. 
76
 Ibid., at para. 41. 
77
 Ibid., at paras. 45–46. 
16 
 
Though fascinating such an idea may be, it is the opinion of the author that such a detailed approach 
is incompatible with the general nature of obligations that characterize customary norms and, in any 
case, with the current practice and opinio juris of States. It is, therefore, submitted that, at the 
current stage of development of international law, the content of an EIA cannot but be determined 
by the international treaties that States are party to, which, in turn, will impact on their domestic 
law. This is why the adoption of soft law instruments (such as the UNEP Principles), as well as the 
ratification of the Espoo Convention, will be of the essence for the advancement of the practice to 
undertake an EIA. 
